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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No.  06-4516
                              
YAN QIN LI,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
                                                                                                                   
On Petition for Review of an Order of
The Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese
(No. A79-814-563)
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 8, 2008
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed February 21, 2008 )
                              
OPINION
                              
 She challenges the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal, but has1
waived any argument with respect to the CAT by not raising it in her opening brief to our
Court.  Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)–(9).
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Yan Qin Li, a Chinese citizen born in 1983, entered the United States in Puerto
Rico without valid entry documents in 2003.  Upon her arrival, the INS served Li with a
notice to appear.  She conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.  She alleges that she
endured economic persecution in China and that, upon her return to that country, would
face further persecution as well as imprisonment and torture.  After a hearing, the IJ
found her not to be credible.  The BIA rejected the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, but
adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.  Li petitioned our Court for review of the BIA’s
decision.   We deny that petition.1
Li’s account of her persecution stems from an incident that occurred on May 16,
1998. On that date, she testified, five officials from her home village of Changle City in
Fujian Province sought to collect one thousand Chinese Yuan from her household for the
construction of a government building.  Li states that her family held the view that the
government should fund its own projects.  She contends, in the alternative, that her family
resisted the request for money because it constituted extortion rather than a legitimate tax. 
For whichever reason, her father refused to pay.  The family (including then fifteen-year-
old Li) argued with the officials, who vaguely threatened retribution.
 She also alleges that the government deemed her father’s boat-pilot license to be2
expired or suspended as a retaliatory measure.
3
Subsequently, the village government took three actions against Li
specifically —actions that she alleges are retaliation for her family’s refusal to pay.  First,2
government officials convinced the administration at her school to spread rumors about
her.  Second, the government refused to grant her a work certificate when her father fell
ill.  Third, after she found work in a toy factory, government officials encouraged her
boss to criticize her performance at work and eventually to fire her.  In response to these
hardships, Li left China in December 2002.  She traveled through Thailand and several
other countries before arriving in Puerto Rico in January 2003, whereupon she received a
notice to appear.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s
decision but stated its own rationale, we review both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions. 
Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  We review as well factual
determinations for substantial evidence.  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir.
2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
To establish eligibility for asylum, Li must show by a reasonable likelihood that
she experienced past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution.  8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).  We agree with the IJ
that Li’s past experiences are not the type of economic harms that our Court considers
Moreover, an asylum applicant must establish that the alleged persecution stems3
from a protected ground.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  Li alleges a threat to her life or
freedom based on only one of the protected grounds listed in the statute: political opinion. 
But we agree with the BIA that Li has not shown that the village government punished
her because of her family’s political opinions.  It is just as plausible, absent any
corroborating evidence for her testimony, that the village government punished her family
simply for failure to pay a legitimate tax.  Therefore, Li has not established that the
Chinese government would threaten her based on a protected ground.
4
persecution.  See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993) (stating that, for
purposes of asylum, economic persecution must be so severe as to “constitute a threat to
life or freedom”).  She contends that the village government harassed and spread rumors
about her, but not that they imprisoned her or threatened her life in any way.  She did not
experience past economic persecution under our Court’s definition of the concept.
Establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution includes demonstrating both
subjective and objective components to an asylum applicant’s fear.  Abdille v. Ashcroft,
242 F.3d 477, 495–96 (3d Cir.2001).  Even taking Li’s subjective fear as credible (as the
IJ did not but the BIA did), we also agree with the BIA that she has not established the
necessary objective component of a well-founded fear of persecution.  She presented no
evidence to suggest that the village government’s treatment of her would worsen upon her
return to China.  Thus, she has not established a reasonable likelihood of future
persecution.   Her asylum claim must fail.3
As Li fails to meet the more lenient burden for asylum (a reasonable likelihood of
persecution, which is less than a preponderance of the evidence), she ipso facto fails to
5meet the stricter burden for withholding of removal (more likely than not).  See Fadiga v.
Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2007).
For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.
